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From One-Dimensional Man to One-
Dimensions Economy and Economics 
 
Ben Fine, SOAS University of London 
 
Abstract: Taking Herbert Marcuse’s classic One-Dimensional Man as a critical point of 
departure, this contribution is framed around the insight that complex and 
contradictory underlying determinants in capitalism are subject to outcomes and 
appearances that are conceptualized as one-dimensioning. The latter involves 
reduction to multiple dimensions as opposed to a single dimension, or homogenisation 
for which presumed conformity to the market and monetisation are the most obvious 
manifestations. The argument is illustrated through an account of one-dimensioning 
within the history of economics as a discipline since the marginalist revolution of the 
1870s, and through the rise of financialized neoliberalism. 
  
 
Introduction 
Both the economy and economics offer extraordinarily fertile ground for the hypothesis of the 
one-dimensional nature of contemporary capitalism. For the economy, a seductive starting 
point is Oscar Wilde’s quip in Lady Windermere’s Fan:1 
What is a cynic?  
A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.2 
Less observed is that Wilde continues that not just market value, but use values are susceptible 
to being reduced to a one-dimensional, if absurd, sentimentalism: 
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1 Oscar Wilde, “Lady Windermere's Fan,” in The Importance of Being Earnest and Other Plays (London: 
Pocket Books, 2005), 105-182. The play, a satirical comedy, was first produced at St. James’s Theatre in 
London, and it was first published in 1893. 
2 Wilde, “Lady Windermere’s Fan,” 161-162. 
This is the accepted version of the article published online in Radical Philosophy Review on April 21, 2017: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201741970  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24069/  
 
And a sentimentalist…is a man who sees an absurd value in everything, and 
doesn't know the market price of any single thing.3 
Such is an elementary play on the dialectic between use value and exchange value. It will 
be taken up in the first section, with the commodity serving as major point of critical departure 
from the dualism between cynicism and sentimentalism. From there, a journey will be taken in 
subsections through more abstract notions of the commodity, the commodity form, and 
commodity calculation to their contemporary attachments to financialization and neoliberalism. 
Further, as addressed in the second major section, the dismal science of (mainstream) 
economics—so dubbed by the reactionary Thomas Carlyle for its reliance upon supply and 
demand and failure to distinguish classes and the roles they should play (allowing slavery, 
perversely, if it were but freely imposed)—is renowned for its lack of dimensions. Mainstream 
economics has, along with many other terms of abuse, been characterized as monoeconomics.4 
The exact nature of this dimensionlessness will be explored in subsections marking the passage 
from the marginalist revolution of the 1870s to the “freakonomics” of the present day, 
demonstrating its elusive attachment to the economy it purports to examine. 
 
Across each of these narratives, the idea that the economy and economics are becoming 
confined to a single dimension is firmly rejected, as if attached to some sort of McDonaldization 
and/or globalization thesis.5 Rather, Herbert Marcuse’s notion of one-dimensional man is 
appropriately very different, in application to both the society of his time and the scholarships 
that it spawned. For the world is appropriately perceived by Marcuse to be subject to 
contradictions, whose underlying tensions are merely addressed at superficial levels by others, 
in one-dimensional theory and practice, in seeking to flatten determinants to forms and to shift 
between one form and another rather than to reveal and resolve their underlying tensions. Such 
is most obvious in the dialectic between spiralling consumer needs and the inability of their 
fulfilment to generate satisfaction. But this is by no means the sole nor the most important 
reduction to single dimensions as evidenced by Marcuse’s wide-ranging critique, albeit one that 
could hardly be expected to have anticipated the syndrome in the context of today’s specific 
financialized neoliberalism. 
 
On a more personal and indulgent note, I read One-Dimensional Man as an ingénue 
Marxist student in the early 1970s, and I revisited it in researching consumption in the early 
1990s (when I was highly critical more generally of the idea of consumer society).6 In returning 
to the text once more for this article, I find myself more favorably inclined, at least to its more 
general thesis of one-dimensional man, and have taken the opportunity to review my own ideas 
about the economy and economics through the prism of what I prefer to call one-dimensions, 
rather than one-dimensional, as this seems to capture Marcuse’s thrust more accurately against 
popular interpretations of capitalism (and neoliberalism, globalization and financialization—
see below) as homogenizingly uniform. This has, though, meant an unusual degree of 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 162. 
4 My own preference has been for “Zombieconomics.” Ben Fine, “Zombieconomics: The Living Death of the 
Dismal Science,” in Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko, eds., The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse 
of an Economic Order? (London: Zed Books, 2010). 
5George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of 
Contemporary Social Life (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1993); George Ritzer, The Globalization of 
Nothing (London: Pine Forge Press, 2003). 
6See Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold, The World of Consumption (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Ben Fine 
and Ellen Leopold, “Consumerism and the Industrial Revolution,” Social History 15, no. 2 (1990): 151-179; 
Ben Fine, The World of Consumption, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2002); Ben Fine, “Consumption Matters: 
The Politics of Consumption,” Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization 13, no. 2 (2013): 217-248. 
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referencing to my own work for more detailed discussion of the arguments offered. But, in short, 
I view Marcuse as projecting a sort of flattening of both material and cultural worlds, not their 
homogenizing into a single dimension, however much he has been subsequently subject to more 
popular if less nuanced interpretation. This offers a powerful prism through which to view the 
contemporary economy and the orthodox, mainstream, neoclassical economics it has 
spawned—as opposed to marginalized heterodoxies, including Marxist political economy, that 
continue to view capitalism in systemic and dialectical terms, respectively.  
 
The Economy 
A. From Commodity Fetishism… 
The most general expression of the one-dimensional nature of capitalism is money. But money 
itself is a complex thing, with many dimensions, each of which has its own dimensions. First, not 
least as observed by Marx in the opening chapters of Capital, money is itself a commodity, a 
general equivalent to all other commodities through which they express their value in price 
form. As a result, the use value of the commodity is reduced to the single dimension of price. 
Moreover, as highlighted by Marx through the notion of commodity fetishism, the relations 
between producers are expressed as, or reduced to, a monetary relationship. How much does 
this thing cost to buy?  
Marx’s purpose is to uncover the class relations of production that underpin not only the 
origins of the commodity as such but also the basis on which it can be attached to the 
production and realization of profit. The vast majority of the three volumes of Capital are 
concerned with how surplus value is produced, distributed, and realized and with what 
consequences—issues that remain controversial in interpretation but at the heart of Marxist 
political economy. The purpose here though is to emphasize a different feature of commodity 
fetishism and its reduction of dimensions. For it is but a simple step from seeing it in terms of 
the concealment of the class relations of production to embracing a comparable fetishism of all 
aspects, or dimensions, of social relations. Not only class relations (in the narrow sense of who 
produces what, for whom, under what working conditions) but also, for example, gender and 
environmental relations are concealed by commodity fetishism—or at least to the extent that 
they are not part and parcel of immediately observable use value. For, just as there is no 
mistaking gas-guzzling vehicles or the gendered nature of many products, these do not reveal 
the corresponding relations under which they have been produced (leading, for example, to 
attempts to uncover them as with carbon footprints). 
Indirectly, such an extension of how commodity fetishism is conceived sheds some light 
on one of the few aspects of the capitalist economy that drew Marcuse’s close attention in One-
Dimensional Man, the one-dimensional freedom of choice that can be exercised over an ever-
expanding domain of false, generated, and even repressive needs. In the wake of a postmodern 
world, that needs might be false raises some serious issues of interpretation given that all needs, 
including the “true” and even those essential to minimal survival, are unavoidably socially 
constructed in their content and meaning. But, as I have argued at great length and with many 
examples in the system of provision approach to the material culture of consumption,7 how such 
needs are generated and fulfilled (or not) is highly contingent upon the social relations under 
which they are provided but concealed. What you are wearing is child labor, what you are 
driving is environmental degradation, and so on just as much as they might be the height of 
                                                 
7 See Fine, The World of Consumption (2002). See also Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Mary Robertson, “From 
Financialisation to Consumption: The System of Provision Approach Applied to Housing and Water,” 
FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 2 (2013); Fine, “Consumption Matters: The Politics of Consumption.”  
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fashion and symbols of masculinity or femininity. The one-dimensional nature of consumption 
is its capacity to conceal as much as it is to promote, and it is a consequence of the money form 
taken by the commodity as the means to access consumption. All I need to know is what I want 
and that I have the money to get it. 
 
B. …Through Commodity Form and Calculation… 
But money does not simply constitute a means of payment for accessing commodities, it also 
creates a standard, literally a dimension, for activity and evaluation even where commodities as 
such are not involved. We think and act in money terms even where money is not present, or at 
least is not in use in paying for a commodity, thereby at least indirectly and informally 
endowing the nonmonetary with a monetary dimension. In other words, the scope of money is 
very much wider than the world of commodities. The presence of money in the absence of 
commodities can take two forms. On the one hand, there is where money is, indeed, paid for 
whatever purpose but through which corresponding noncommodity activity and relations are 
mediated. An obvious example is bribery or corruption, or simply the more mundane payment 
of pocket money. Possibly, the most prominent example is social security where, for example, 
the impoverished or the unemployed are reduced to the dimension of state beneficiary, with 
their entitlements contingent on consideration of their personal circumstances as opposed to 
the systemic factors underpinning their plight. As it were, the price of unemployment is reduced 
to the payment of money by way of compensation for lack of a job; but, it can hardly be 
considered a commodity—and the causes and nature of such unemployment, either individually 
or collectively, are concealed rather than revealed by such one-dimensional payments, at a level 
inevitably less than one-dimensionally equivalent to a wage. 
On the other hand, in contrast to the one-dimensional presence of money in the absence 
of the commodity, there is what might be termed monetary or commodity calculation where 
money is not directly involved but is used as a measure for evaluation. This, in other words, is 
where the cynic who knows the price of everything joins hands with the sentimentalist who 
sees the worth in everything. That worth can be translated into a price. I could save money by 
doing this myself, or even value life itself in terms of whether the state should fund various 
forms of healthcare, etc. Cost-benefit analysis is such calculation par excellence and is the 
reduction of all considered aspects of life to the single dimension of money. 
 
C. …To Money as Capital and Financialization 
Because of their attachment to money, commodities, commodity forms, and commodity 
calculations all have the potential to one-dimension both economic and social life.8Further, 
capitalism has a tendency not only to expand the realms of the commodity, commodity form, 
and commodity calculation (at the expense of the “sentimental”) but also to transform one to 
the other. Commodification, in particular, is powerfully prompted by the expansion of capitalist 
production into new, or recaptured areas as with the spread of commerce and capitalism 
historically and privatization of nationalized industries and public services in more recent times. 
In this respect, the one-dimensional nature of money endows it with a second dimension, the 
                                                 
8 See Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Mary Robertson, “Introduction to Special Issue on the Material Cultures 
of Financialisation,” New Political Economy (forthcoming; published online November 28, 2016); Ben Fine, 
“The Material and Culture of Financialisation,” New Political Economy (forthcoming; published online 
November 28, 2016). 
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role of money as capital rather than simply as means of payment (and, in addition, as store of 
value). As a result, money goes beyond facilitating sale and purchase and, equally, is borrowed 
and lent for the one-dimensional process of self-expansion—more of the same thing, money. But, 
whilst the borrower seeks that expansion through some other commercial activity such as 
production in pursuit of profit, the lender takes a share of this surplus, expanding the initial 
advance of money merely by virtue of ownership of what has been lent which is expected to be 
returned with interest, dividends, or the like. 
But this distinction between money as money (or simply buying and selling on credit, 
which adds no new value but merely redistributes it) and money as capital (in pursuit of added 
value) is of no significance as such to those lending the money, unless it is deemed to affect the 
security of their asset and its anticipated return. Indeed, the paper value of the asset, like the 
monetary value of the commodity, as the discounted value of the stream of anticipated returns, 
is oblivious to the processes by which it is generated. In other words, the separation between 
money as money and money as capital is rendered one-dimensional in the forms it assumes. 
This is apparent in the formation of what Marx calls fictitious capital.9 For all claims on 
future revenue, however generated, can be securitized and constitute an asset with a paper 
value. Irrespective of how the returns are to be generated (and not depending necessarily nor 
even usually on fictional, deceitful activity), fictitious capital can be constituted as a paper asset 
and be bought and sold independently of the original ownership let alone the putative source of 
its value. As a result, the differences in the forms and functions of money are highly fluid in 
relationship to one another. Across their different dimensions, they are interchangeable 
precisely because their deep but hidden roots, both individually and systemically, in economic 
and social structures, processes, relations, and agents are unrevealed—much as exchange value 
reveals so little of value relations. As someone put it to me in terms of the US subprime crisis, 
there are houses out there, no doubt they have a value as the basis on which corresponding 
mortgages have been bought and sold, but the underlying houses are valued as if seen through a 
television screen in which most of the pixels are no longer working! 
 
Not surprisingly, such fetishisms are sharply if partially revealed in an economic crisis, 
when the transformation of just some portion of money capital into its alter ego, money as 
such—through the failure of the economy to be able to realize anticipated returns, as with the 
US subprime crisis—leads to a domino effect across corresponding fictitious capital as a whole. 
Everyone wants their money back at whatever price and at the expense of no longer dedicating 
it to continuing economic activity, with recession resulting as the value of fictitious capital is 
individually pursued at collective expense.  
But, not least since One-Dimensional Man was first published, the growth in fictitious 
capital has been prodigious. During the last thirty years, the ratio of such assets to gross 
domestic product (GDP) at a global level, with the United States and the United Kingdom in the 
lead, has gone up by three times. In other words, it takes three times as much finance to make 
something (including financial services themselves, which previously used to be considered as 
not contributing to GDP10) than it did previously. If this were true of anything else, across both 
raw material and labor, it would be considered disastrous—as, indeed, it has been.  
Over the past decade, this growth in fictitious capital has been analyzed from a number 
of different perspectives, across the social sciences and heterodox economics if not the 
                                                 
9 See Ben Fine and Alfred Saad-Filho, Marx’s Capital, 6th ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2016). 
10 See Brett Christophers, Banking Across Boundaries: Placing Finance in Capitalism (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013). 
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mainstream (see below), under the newly emerged concept of “financialization.”11 In many 
instances, this amounts to little more than, unsurprisingly, observing the presence and effects of 
more finance in our economic and social (everyday) lives. Equally unsurprisingly, 
financialization is shown to be dysfunctional and detrimental especially in the wake and 
through the prism of the global crisis. Particularly prominent has been the idea that 
financialization exploits us all,12 although this is an undue extrapolation from the idea that it is 
associated with lower real wages, high unemployment, austerity, and cuts and privatization in 
social services, and credit card abuse to sustain norms of consumption (as opposed to 
imperatives driven from above and trickling down in these forms to the most disadvantaged).  
I take a different view in some respects. First is that financialization of everyday life is 
not best seen as driven by the disadvantaged. On the contrary, such is driven by those who are 
better off and, to a large degree, by those whose status is consolidated by financialization. This 
is true of those who own housing in a bubble as their asset appreciates (and they still own it 
after the bubble bursts) as opposed to those, potentially a significant minority, who are driven 
to sell their homes as a result of mortgage default. This, though, is not to deny that 
financialization is associated with growing inequalities, with the more general policies and 
forms of governance attached to neoliberalism, and with more and more sources of what might 
be termed variegated vulnerabilities to impoverishment.13 
Rather, second, this is indicative of the expansion of finance into ever more areas of 
economic and social reproduction. This takes two forms, the intensive and the extensive. The 
former is longstanding within the functioning of capitalism, involving the use of fictitious capital 
in the processes of capital accumulation—although its expansion and diversity have become 
prodigious as indicated by the proliferation of acronyms through which financial assets have 
been denominated (with corresponding sets of grades by rating agencies, once more 
representing the reduction of social relations of production or, more exactly, profiting to a 
single dimension akin to reducing the educational process to the marking of examinations, for 
which remark I get AAA+++!).  
However, the extensive form of financialization, as previously mentioned, involves the 
penetration of finance into ever more areas of economic and social life, not least with 
privatization and commercialization of social provision, most notably in housing finance and 
pensions. But the important point here is less or, more exactly, not only who gains and who 
loses in these processes but also that the nature of the way in which provision takes place has 
been transformed. This is most obvious in case of the difference between a public and a private 
health system, in which the fees from the latter are also bundled up into a fictitious asset for the 
purposes of financial dealing.  
More specifically, consider the example of the privatized water industry in the United 
Kingdom.14 Household charges provide a steady stream of revenue for the companies involved 
as long as certain regulatory standards are met. Allowable costs include interest charges on 
financing for long-term investment alongside dividends and executive salaries all of which have 
                                                 
11 See Ben Fine, “Towards a Material Culture of Financialisation,” FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 15 
(2013); and Ben Fine, “Financialization from a Marxist Perspective,” International Journal of Political 
Economy 42, no. 4 (2013): 47–66. 
12 See Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All (London: Verso, 2013). 
13 Ben Fine, Kate Bayliss, and Mary Robertson (2016) “From Financialisation to Systems of Provision”, 
FESSUD Working Paper Series, no.  191, (2016).  
14 See Kate Bayliss, “Case Study: The Financialisation of Water in England and Wales,” FESSUD Working 
Paper Series, no. 52 (July 2014).  
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ballooned, whilst the prospective revenues and guaranteed profits (too wet to fail as it were) 
have been incorporated into a pyramid of globally organized holding companies whose ultimate 
pinnacle are to be found in locations such as the Cayman Islands. Are the customers turning the 
tap on at home or in a tax haven? 
Such is the one-dimensional nature of the financialized economy. It is not simply that 
consumers are enabled and induced to chase an ever-expanding target of unfulfilled needs (and 
do not forget the emergence of “falsely” needed bottled waters alongside household supply). 
Nor is there merely the alienation of work and the worker across a variety of dimensions that 
are reduced to contribution to surplus production and appropriation. Nor is it confined to the 
reduction of water and, correspondingly, nature to the one-dimension of private property (who 
owns the clouds?). Nor is it just the reduction of a basic human need to the ability to pay. Rather, 
it is all of these together with their incorporation into the one-dimensional domain of fictitious 
capital, literally as well as geographically far removed from, but still attached to, a fetishized 
water system. 
 
It is understandable that Marcuse should not have addressed a prospective 
financialization in One-Dimensional Man, and his account of economic issues there is limited and 
primarily focused upon the consumer and the dialectic of needs. He writes: 
The creation of repressive needs has long since become part of socially 
necessary labor—necessary in the sense that without it, the established mode of 
production could not be sustained. Neither problems of psychology nor of 
aesthetics are at stake, but, the material base of domination.15 
Even so, there are other aspects of the passage from production to consumption that could have 
drawn his attention and been deployed to demonstrate his one-dimensional thesis. Significantly, 
whilst clearly influenced by the thesis of hidden persuaders, and affluent and consumer society, 
he does not seem to be attracted to the monopoly capital school’s understanding of the United 
States as subject to underconsumptionist stagnation.16 
 
This is illustrative of the context in which One-Dimensional Man was drafted, for which a 
hypothesis of underconsumption is not conducive to an emphasis upon a spiralling of 
unfulfilling needs (lest these be a vent for surplus). But, in addition, the US context in the middle 
of the postwar boom is also liable to have discouraged attention to the possibility of crises and, 
despite expanding economic and social wages, there are other absences such as the form and 
content taken by class relations and conflict.  
Indeed, there is an aura of suppression of both of the latter in deference to the nulling 
effects of ersatz consumerism. Instead, Marcuse readily acknowledges the tensions, resistances, 
and struggles that, nonetheless, derive from opposition to the varieties of suppression that do 
inevitably arise. This is, however, to underplay the more organized and institutionalized forms 
of class relations, structures, conflicts, and compromises that were characteristic of other 
countries during the postwar boom, let alone the rise of multinational corporations and the role 
of the state in facilitating corresponding national and international social and economic 
transformation and reproduction.  
 
                                                 
15 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, 2nd ed. 
(1964; Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), 246. 
16 For one of the earliest accounts of the rising significance of finance, see Harry Magdoff and Paul M. 
Sweezy, Stagnation and the Financial Explosion (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987). 
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The One-Dimensions of Neoliberalism17 
And it is across the roles of the state and the global that the presence of the one-dimensional 
economy can be taken further, not least with the rise of neoliberalism. For during the last thirty 
years, alongside financialization at its heart, is a transformed relationship between the state and 
the market, although this dualism is itself a fetishized form through which underlying economic, 
political, and ideological interests are expressed—by no means representing a zero sum of more 
of one at the expense of the other. Rather than indicating the withdrawal of the state, 
neoliberalism has involved extensive intervention to promote private capital in general, and 
finance in particular, even if ideologically veiling this intervention in terms of deference to 
market forces—a deceit that has been massively exposed by the support given to finance in the 
wake of the recent crisis (together with a rapidly evaporating anomie to financial rewards and 
loose re-regulation). 
Further, two loosely delineated phases of neoliberalism can be identified that can, across 
time, place, and issue, be subject to shift, acceleration and/or overlaying. The first, appropriately 
dubbed “shock therapy” in the Latin American and post-Soviet adjustments, runs primarily into 
the mid-1990s. It involves aggressive pursuit of the interests of private global capital, and of 
finance in particular, with limited regard to the dysfunctions that arise. Subsequently, the 
second phase, particularly associated with Third Wayism and the post-Washington Consensus, 
is marked by some response to dysfunctions, including social conflicts to which they give rise, 
whilst continuing to sustain the financialization of economic and social life.  
These two phases are also associated, respectively, with what has been termed the 
rolling back of the state followed by the rolling out of the state. In other words, the role (and one-
dimensional rolls) of the state has been transformed, not necessarily diminished, through 
financialized neoliberalism. This is notable not only in policy but also in the institutions through 
which policy is formed and implemented, not least with the increasing presence of private 
capital (through privatization and public-private partnerships) and commercialization (user 
charges) and the corresponding institutionalized diminution of an already limited popular 
participation in delivery.  
An inevitable consequence of these developments is that outcomes under neoliberalism 
are highly diverse. On the one hand, the incidence and forms taken by financialization are highly 
uneven as are the intensity and extent of its reach across both economic and social reproduction. 
On the other hand, given the degree of financialization, how it interacts with such reproduction 
is itself contingent upon sphere of application and context. Not every country had a subprime 
housing crisis, not every form of social provision, indeed very few beyond pensions, 
experienced such a crisis especially on such a grand scale. 
It is questionable whether such developments can be adequately captured in the 
Polanyian notion of double movement.18 This is inadequate for homogenising within, and 
possibly across, finance, labor, and land as each is deemed to be subject to a reaction against 
                                                 
17 For discussion of neoliberalism along lines suggested here, see Ben Fine, “Neoliberalism in Retrospect? 
It’s Financialisation, Stupid,” in Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited 
by Chang, Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, and Linda Weiss (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 51-69. See also 
Ben Fine, Alfred Saad-Filho, Kate Bayliss, and Mary Robertson, “Thirteen Things You Need to Know about 
Neoliberalism,” FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 155 (2016), revised as Ben Fine and Alfred Saad-Filho, 
“Thirteen Things You Need to Know about Neoliberalism,” Critical Sociology (forthcoming; published 
online August 2016). 
18
 For further discussion on the Polanyian notion of double movement, see Fine, et al., “Thirteen Things You 
Need to Know about Neoliberalism.” 
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being increasingly commodified. How each of these is (re)commodified or decommodified is 
highly heterogeneous. In addition, such putative double movements are not confined to these 
three “commodities” alone but, potentially, across all areas of economic and social provision. 
Such movements are also heavily conditioned, if not determined, by the strength, 
balance, and forms taken by class and other forms of conflict. Here, there are two crucial 
starting points to observe. First is that, if less in the United States, which may have unduly 
influenced Marcuse’s outlook, the “Keynesian” period was marked by powerful trade unions and 
social democratic parties seeking reform and shared benefits of growth through negotiated 
compromises, what has been termed social compacting. Under neoliberalism, such social 
compacting has been rolled back and, where rolled out, has taken on an entirely different 
character, namely limited in scope and confined to negotiating the austerities associated with 
adjustments. Significantly, unlike the developmental states, or East Asian Newly-Industrialized 
Countries (NICs), of the postwar boom, such as South Korea, capitalist success did not depend, 
as it does today—as exemplified by China—upon merely holding speculative finance in check as 
opposed to coordinating state-capital relations and incorporating or suppressing working class 
demands.  
Second is how striking is the failure of global capitalism, not only in its current crisis but 
also in its relatively poor pace of accumulation under the two previous phases of neoliberalism. 
This is despite what might be considered to have been the most favorable circumstances for 
global capitalism across almost every criterion. There has been an unprecedented availability of 
new technologies, the decline in strength, organization, and aspirations of working class and 
liberation movements, the curtailment of economic and social wages (no one blames these for 
the crisis although their reduction is perceived as necessary to resolve the crisis), a 
corresponding triumph of neoliberal policies more generally, an unprecedented increase in the 
capitalist global labor force with developments in China, international migration, and female 
labor market participation, and victory in the Cold War ushering in the new world order. 
In this light, neoliberalism appears in some respects to offer a negative photographic 
image, not a negation, of Marcuse’s one-dimension. Far from guaranteeing stability, capitalist 
accumulation has faltered despite, even in part because of, consumer-led aspirations 
underpinned by credit. This is not the consequence of the strength of protest and conflict but of 
its relative absence (as is evident in the response to the crisis and the failure for alternatives 
successfully to emerge even in the presence of bourgeois hegemony). On the other hand, the 
diversities and unevenness of neoliberalism have spawned a multitude of conflicts and 
resistances arising out of deprivations and unfulfilled aspirations within the confines of One-
Dimensional Man. In short, Marcuse writes: 
The struggle for the solution has outgrown the traditional forms. The 
totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional 
ways and means of protest ineffective—perhaps even dangerous because they 
preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty.19 
For Marcuse, immediately continuing, and at the point in time when financialization and 
neoliberalism were about to reverse the narrowing of inequality: 
This illusion contains some truth: “the people,” previously the ferment of social 
change, have “moved up” to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather 
                                                 
19 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 256. 
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than in the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new 
stratification characteristic of advanced industrial society.20 
Reference to “industrial society” again occurs at the cusp of the origins of financialization. By 
“the new stratification,” Marcuse refers to the “substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the 
exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the 
unemployable.”21 To them is attributed, “Their force is behind every political demonstration for 
the victims of law and order.”22 Nonetheless, Marcuse states: 
Nothing indicates that it will be a good end. The economic and technical 
capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for 
adjustments and concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces 
sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations.23 
Such is a mixed anticipation of neoliberalism, with allowance now needing to be 
made that the ferment of social inclusion is increasingly one of exclusion or variegated 
vulnerabilities, that underdog and dog have more rather than less shared experiences of 
deprivation, the power of the industrial is incorporated with the financial, and the 
totalitarian has rendered protest as much strangled and displaced as it is ineffective.24 
 
Economics 
A. From One-Dimensioning of Marginalism…   
Such sets the scene for the portrayal of mainstream economics and its multiplicity of one-
dimensions. Indeed, the discipline in its orthodoxy offers an ideal and bountiful illustration of 
Marcuse’s hypothesis. This is a consequence of its overwhelming enthusiasm for reflecting and 
embracing in scholarship the fetishisms attached to commodification, commodity form, and 
commodity calculation. It all begins, at least in its extreme form, with the marginalist revolution 
of the 1870s that witnessed the displacement of the classical (and/or class) political economy—
of the likes of Smith, Ricardo and Marx—by the optimizing individuals of what was to become 
neoclassical economics.25 In short, one-dimensional reliance on methodological individualism 
came to the fore with the marginalist revolution, and the dimensions of that individual were 
even further reduced to the utility-maximizing calculus of homo economicus.  
This did not happen all at once. Indeed, from the 1870s to the 1950s, one part of the 
discipline dedicated itself to extracting the fullest possible deductive implications from 
assuming optimizing individuals. By setting itself this goal, what was to become 
microeconomics systematically if unwittingly began to one-dimension itself. The reason was 
                                                 
20 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 257. 
23 Ibid. 
24  And, opportunistically, it might be observed that we enter a topsy-turvy world of political 
representation in which elites can be overturned in a moment by essentially otherwise ineffective, if 
potentially reactionary, popular dissent, not least as social democracy submits to media populism. At this 
point in time, Trumpism and Brexitism appear as exemplary illustrations of one-dimensioning. 
25 But note that the one-dimensional fetishism of deductivism and the reduction of (labor) value to its 
price form is heavily characteristic of Ricardo (if, at least, attracting Marx’s praise as bourgeois, as 
opposed to vulgar, political economy par excellence for retaining labor as the source of value). 
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that anything that got in the way of deriving supply and demand curves, of how quantities on 
the market respond to prices, simply had to be assumed away or, in other words, squashed flat.  
Thus, the eponymous notion of utility (function) departed a more rounded, many-
dimensional understanding of individual well-being and became identified with a simple 
product of what could be consumed through access to goods purchased through the market 
(together with the disutility of effort and time lost due to work in return for the wage).26 
Moreover, even such utility functions were required to be fixed—no systematic consumer 
demand if preferences are allowed to change at all for whatever reason. The implication is that 
individuals are themselves one-dimensional not only in their motivation of utility maximization 
but also in their very identity and capacity to make their own identity and for it to be able to 
evolve. Individuals and their utility are one and the same, and the pursuit of the latter by the 
former is indistinguishable from the actions of an automaton.  
Whilst the theory of value based on (marginal) utility is known as subjective because it 
comes from the preferences of individuals, it is a heavily crushed subjectivity in that those 
individuals have no choice or reflection over what they are. And, by the same token, the nature 
of the goods themselves is reduced to the single dimension of contributing to utility. They can 
only be defined by their physical properties as opposed to their socially constructed and 
endowed meanings, let alone how these are reflected upon and internalized by the individual 
consumer. 
Exactly the same reductionism applies to the realm of production. This, in the equally 
ubiquitous production function, is seen simply as a relationship between physically defined 
inputs and outputs, a technical relationship once again, stripped of any reference to the social 
relations of production. Moreover, technology is taken as given so that the more or less 
unproblematic buying of inputs and the selling of outputs suffices to specify the equally one-
dimensional role assumed by the capitalist.  
In short, in order to set up what can be termed its technical apparatus of utility and 
production functions, the theory simply discarded any inconveniences whether they be 
conceptual, methodological, otherwise unavoidable determinants, and even claims to realism 
and common sense. It was equally necessary to isolate the analysis of supply and demand on the 
market from dimensions such as the social, political, ideological or institutional factors, and 
from the influence of social determinants such as collective conflict and the exercise of power. 
Individuals simply went about their business of buying and selling in pursuit of harmonized 
self-interests. They increasingly did so in an economics that was further one-dimensioned by 
consolidating its separation from the other social sciences that in turned incorporated a richer 
set of methods, theories, and concepts. 
With such a technical apparatus in place by the end of the 1930s, thereby creating a sort 
of implosion upon the calculus of homo economicus, ambitions were widened to allow for the 
apparatus to be extended to understand the workings of the economy as a whole in what 
became known as general equilibrium theory, the bringing together of the supplies and demands 
of all individuals. Here the pinnacle of achievement in formal mathematical terms was realized 
in the 1950s, as the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the workings of the economic system 
                                                 
26 Thereby also crushing the inextricable link with the ethical content of economic analysis and insisting 
upon a separation between positive and normative economics. See Ben Fine, “Economics—Unfit for 
Purpose: The Director’s Cut,” Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 
University of London, Working Paper Series, no. 176 (2013). Revised and shortened as, Ben Fine, 
“Economics: Unfit for Purpose,” Review of Social Economy 71, no. 3 (2013): 373-389. 
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as a whole were demonstrated (albeit under extraordinarily restrictive conditions on its own 
terms). This gave rise to what can be termed a technical architecture to complement the 
technical apparatus, one in which the economy as a whole is perceived in terms of the narrowly 
defined efficiency of its putative equilibrium.27 
Whilst the emergence of this technical apparatus and architecture was anticipated by Lionel 
Robbins in the early 1930s, in defining economics as the allocation of scarce resources between 
competing ends,28 it evolved alongside and, initially, as a junior partner to both the newly 
emerging Keynesianism and the more longstanding economic history and the old institutional, 
Veblenesque-style, economics that focused, respectively, on the putatively distinct short- and 
long-run movements of the economy as a whole. What these shared in common, but not with 
microeconomics, was a variety of systemic approaches, which were seen almost as second 
nature—as essential both to address the most immediate problems posed by the Great 
Depression and to draw lessons from its historical origins and its antecedents. 
 
B. …Through the Formalist Revolution and Economics Imperialism… 
In short, the one-dimensions of economics as it evolved in the postwar period constituted a 
fourfold division across macroeconomics, microeconomics, a bundle of applied and empirically 
driven fields, and a corresponding detachment from nonmarket relations and other social 
sciences. Initially, macroeconomics took precedence over microeconomics as the leading field in 
deference to Keynesianism but, following what was called the formalist revolution of the 1950s, 
the mathematical methods of microeconomics increasingly held sway over macroeconomics as 
well. This shared method in theory and presentation, purported to elevate economics to the 
status of a physical science (whilst, through commitment to what was termed positive economics 
being blissfully ignorant of debates around the scientific method) and equally had the effect of 
marginalizing the status of other applied and empirical fields whilst, at least, allowing them a 
degree of independence in view of being unsuited to the core methods. Such was true of fields 
like development, public, industrial, and regional economics. Significantly, the exception that 
proves the rule, something termed welfare economics, was perceived to be limited to 
propositions derivable from the technical apparatus and architecture, and subject to allowing 
for an unquestioned Pareto efficiency, explicitly deemed to be deliberately devoid of any ethical 
content outside the domain of positive economics. 
Nonetheless, the seeds of change had already been sown within this configuration of 
dimensions. For, paradoxically, despite the implosion to a technical apparatus, of utility and 
production functions, within microeconomics, being rationalized by the notion of solely 
studying one sort of economic behavior exclusively in the context of market supply and demand, 
the principles that emerged proved to be logically unlimited in their scope of application. After 
all, maximizing utility or outputs from inputs has nothing as such to do with the market. So 
black holing rather than one-dimensioning the economy had the paradoxical effect of opening 
                                                 
27 The notions of technical apparatus and architecture can be abbreviated as TA2. Humam Al-Jazaeri, 
“Interrogating Technical Change through the History of Economic Thought in the Context of Latecomers’ 
Industrial Development: The Case of the South Korean Microelectronics, Auto and Steel Industries,” 
unpublished PhD thesis (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2008). For 
a critical treatment of one-dimensioning of the discipline in its two core fields of macroeconomics and 
microeconomics, see Ben Fine, Microeconomics: A Critical Companion (London: Pluto, 2016); Ben Fine and 
Ourania Dimakou, Macroeconomics: A Critical Companion (London: Pluto, 2016). 
28 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan, 1932). 
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the prospect of a big bang for microeconomics across both economics itself and the social 
sciences more generally (the latter being termed economics imperialism). It gave rise to what 
has been termed the historical logic of imperialism. Historically, the technical apparatus and 
architecture of microeconomics could only be established by confining itself to supply and 
demand on the market, and by discarding all methods, theories, concepts, and realism (or 
dimensions of dimensions) with which it was incompatible. But, logically, the outcome was a 
theory that was of universal applicability (e.g., individuals maximize utility irrespective of time, 
place, issue, and context) and not confined to the market. The scene was set for a redrawing of 
the dimensions confining microeconomics to market supply and demand on the basis of 
individual behavior, perversely, paradoxically, and inconsistently precisely by bringing back in, 
if selectively, those elements that had been black holed to establish the technical content in the 
first place.  
The effect was felt immediately in three areas in particular: the economics of education in 
which the latter was reduced to the single dimension of costs and (waged) benefits of schooling, 
training, and other sources of skills; public choice theory in which the choice between war and 
peace was reduced explicitly to the same dimension as choice between apples and pears; and 
the new economic history for which, typical for this first phase of economics imperialism, major 
change was reduced to the dimension of self-interest and profitability as if conducted through 
perfectly working markets, as applied to explain the abolition of slavery. To hammer home the 
point for the last example, techniques for economic analysis were established by setting aside 
power, conflict, collective endeavor, even meaning (of slavery, for example, to those struggling 
over it) in order to argue why such issues arose—as slavery was overthrown in pursuit of self-
interest! The point is not that self-interest counts for nothing but that it cannot be one-
dimensioned to fixed individual utility functions. Shall I eat an apple or a pear? Shall I fight in 
the US Civil War and, if so, on which side? 
 
C. …To Neoliberalization 
But the one-dimensional designs of such economics imperialism had to wait upon the end of the 
postwar boom, and the discrediting of Keynesianism with the stagflation of the 1970s, to make 
significant progress beyond the initial stars of economics imperialism. It witnessed not only the 
triumph of monetarism over Keynesianism but, less observed and possibly even more 
important, the triumph of microeconomics over macroeconomics, with the leading monetarist, 
Robert Lucas—taking over the mantle from Milton Friedman—even declaring that 
macroeconomics is superfluous. This not only underpinned the familiar austerity programs 
associated with neoliberalism but also policies of privatization, deregulation, and so on, 
together with an extraordinary reduction in dimensions of analysis even on its own terms. Thus, 
economic models were wont to rely upon single, so-called representative households and firms, 
to deny that the state could play any role other than shifting supply and demand curves (with 
even these actions tending to be neutralized and ineffective by countervailing responses by the 
optimizing household anticipating higher inflation or taxes as a result), that short-run change 
took place around predetermined long-run paths (or equilibrium), and that other 
institutionalized aspects of modern capitalism, such as multinational corporations, the modern 
financial system and the system of industrial relations, at most constituted epiphenomena that 
could distort the perfect workings of the market. 
The overall result, then, was to reconfigure the one-dimensions of the discipline 
with a further marginalization of the mixed methods associated with the applied fields as 
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well as their increasing subordination to the one-dimensions of microeconomics in 
particular as it brought them within its deductive grasp. Such developments, though, 
have already taken us a decade or so past the time of writing of One-Dimensional Man and, 
to the extent that Marcuse took account of economics there, he would presumably have 
taken more interest in the continuing, what we would now call, heterodox traditions of 
which the unhelpful monopoly capital school, and the more supportive institutionalism 
of John Kenneth Galbraith could have caught his attention.29  
Such have now become the debris from the big bang of economics imperialism. 
Following the monetarist (and microeconomic) counterrevolution against Keynesianism (and 
applied traditions), the discipline as a whole focused upon the neoliberal one-dimension of state 
versus market. With neoliberal scholarship veiling both a reality of heavy intervention to 
promote private capital in general and finance in particular, as well as an authoritarian role for 
the state in guaranteeing the supposedly free play of markets, the result was to inspire a 
corresponding reaction against such dogma in the realm of markets by spawning a new one-
dimension of market imperfections.  
In contrast to the first phase of economics imperialism, in which the nonmarket was 
one-dimensioned by treating it as if it were a perfectly working market, the second phase one-
dimensions by reducing the nonmarket to the rational, possibly even collectively organized, 
response to, market imperfections. Thus, all nonmarket relations, most notably the state and 
other institutions, and customary, habitual, and even apparently irrational behavior are deemed 
to exist and have effects because markets work imperfectly as opposed, for example, to being 
seen as deeply rooted in, if not determined by, the class relations underpinning economic, 
political, and ideological outcomes. Without wishing to embrace at all the performativity 
thesis—economics makes the economy rather than (primarily if indirectly and mediated) vice-
versa—there is a striking parallel with Marcuse’s attention to the “rationalization of the 
irrational” as far as economics as industrial society and the technology of models is concerned, 
for: 
 
Industrial society possesses the instrumentalities for transforming the 
metaphysical into the physical, the inner into the outer, the adventures of the 
mind into adventures of technology.30  
Consequently, the second phase of economics imperialism has been far more wide-
ranging, virulent, and successful, inspiring or revitalizing a whole new galaxy, not a few stars 
and comets, of one-dimensional fields such as new growth theory, new institutional economics, 
new economic sociology, new welfare economics, new economic history, the new economic 
geography and the new development economics,31 again both bringing back in factors that had 
to be excluded to establish the technical apparatus, and yet deploying that apparatus to explain 
                                                 
29 Although a Keynesian, significantly, Galbraith’s major works were entitled The Affluent Society, The New 
Industrial State, The Anatomy of Power, and so on. To some degree, though, the monopoly capital school 
does see the creation and manipulation of false needs as a response to realization problems. 
30 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 234. 
31 The difference between the first and second phases of economics imperialism is neatly expressed in the 
shift from the Washington Consensus (and Ann Krueger’s rent-seeking) to the post-Washington 
Consensus (and Joe Stiglitz’s asymmetric information, market imperfection economics), leading me to 
propose the formula SS=E=MI2 (or, social science=economics=methodological individualism x market 
imperfections). See Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Waeyenberge, eds., The Political Economy of 
Development: The World Bank, Neoliberalism and Development Research (London: Pluto Press, 2011). 
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and reincorporate them.32 To continue with the metaphor borrowed from Marcuse and applied 
to economics: 
Containment of technical progress goes hand in hand with its growth in the 
established direction…. The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit 
throughout these two features: a trend toward consummation of technological 
rationality, and intensive efforts to contain this trend within the established 
institutions.33 
Further, the extreme monetarism of the 1970s eventually gave way—in the most modest of 
concessions to a diluted renewal of Keynesianism—to the so-called New Consensus 
Macroeconomics, in which it was accepted that some nonfinancial markets might not work 
perfectly but that central bank manipulation of the interest rate was deemed more or less to be 
both the only effective policy instrument and yet sufficient to guarantee stability. 
Unsurprisingly, the current global crisis, and the failure of such policy through 
quantitative easing and practically zero interest rates, has left the discipline not only accused of 
failing to anticipate the crisis but, equally, even of being unable to explain let alone remedy it in 
retrospect. Whilst, in the real world, after paper and temporary excoriation of the bankers, and 
the restoration of their profitability and minimal reregulation, policy has fallen back to the 
default neoliberal stance of austerity. One-dimensioned economics, having reduced itself to a 
few equations totally remote from the processes of financialized economic and social 
reproduction, has proven incapable of incorporating any plausible response to its transparent 
failings. Yet, it appeared to have nowhere to go in reconstructing rather than totally destroying 
itself. 
 
And the Economics of Everything and the Everything of Economics 
But, fools rush in where angels fear to tread, just as hope springs eternal, and, even before the 
crisis, economics imperialism had entered a third phase—reconfiguring its one-dimensions. For, 
in the earlier phases, the optimizing individual reigns supreme whether in the one-dimensional 
domains of perfect or imperfect markets, and no allowance is made for alternative motives or 
forms of behavior (even the rejected bounded rationality of Herbert Simon). Otherwise, 
bringing back in other dimensions, other than on its own reduced terms, would both undermine 
the derivation of the technical apparatus itself and raise doubts over its coherence and range of 
application. But, so secure had the discipline become in its core principles, so inured to 
incoherence and inconsistency across methodological, theoretical, and conceptual practices so 
long as they clung to mathematical forms, and so promiscuous in application of those principles 
and practices, that it soon became second nature to add whatever fitted to the latter, or could be 
plundered, from across social science as a whole. Economics has literally become, as one book 
title puts it, The Economics of Just About Everything, and another, Why Economics Explains Almost 
Everything, although most popularly as Freakonomics.34 
                                                 
32 A particularly revealing illustration is the use of identity-less utility functions to explain individual 
choice of identity, thereby assuming a given (narrow) identity to explain identity and one-dimensioning 
the nature and origins of identity. Ben Fine, “The Economics of Identity and the Identity of Economics?” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, no. 2 (2009): 175-191. 
33 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 17. 
34 Andrew Leigh, The Economics of Just About Everything (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014); Robert H. Frank, 
The Economic Naturalist: Why Economics Explains Almost Everything (London: Virgin Books, 2007); 
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Such has characterized the current phase of economics imperialism with, for example, 
behavioral economics to the fore, or what might be termed economic rationality plus.35 The only 
other dimension not covered in this account so far has been the prodigious expansion of 
empirical methods, or econometrics, not least made possible through the availability of large 
data sets and the generalized computing power to access and manipulate them. This is 
presumed to allow theories to be tested and parameters of adjustment to be estimated, 
reflecting a continuing commitment to falsifiability. But it has served more to accelerate the 
scope and reach of theory by at most casual theoretical justification for models estimated, whilst 
reinforcing the extension of such statistical methods to study the relations across as many 
variables as data availability allows. For Marcuse: 
Scientific thought…outside the physical sciences assumes the form of a pure and 
self-contained formalism (symbolism) on the one hand, and a total empiricism 
on the other…barriers which prevent this empiricism from coming to grips with 
reality, and establishing (or rather re-establishing) the concepts which may 
break these barriers.36 
He might well have had mainstream economics in mind! 
Whether, then, through theoretical or empirical work, economics has ranged far and 
wide across the social sciences. It has targeted a widening scope of application upon the basis of 
an extraordinarily narrow and unjustifiable set of principles, even if these have been marginally 
and opportunistically expanded in its latest phase of economics imperialism. This has led to 
competing interpretations over what is the nature of the discipline and what are its prospects. 
For some it is defined purely by its mathematical methods, for others it is disintegrating as a 
result of its incorporation of untraditional elements from the other social sciences. My own view 
is different, as laid out here, with new one-dimensions being added to those that are 
longstanding and privileged—one-dimensioning more and more social science in the process.  
These developments are indicative of the simultaneous strength and weakness of 
mainstream economics. Its one-dimensional strength lies in the near monopoly that it holds 
over the discipline. It allows for no alternatives and continues to squeeze and exclude those that 
might offer them. Its weakness is multidimensional, reflecting its corresponding lack of 
intellectual integrity. This is evident not only in its contempt for, and lack of willingness to allow, 
let alone debate with, alternatives, but also in its studied ignorance of the history of thought of 
itself as a discipline, methodology, and interdisciplinarity beyond its own imperialist designs.  
Consequently, the weaknesses are subject to being exposed in two ways. On the one 
hand, there is the discipline’s lack of correspondence to, and inability to explain unavoidable 
economic realities, from the implausibility of its starting point in homo economicus to major 
events such as the global crisis—from the atom to the universe. On the other hand, partly in its 
attempt to compensate for its inability to explain the economy on its own limited terms, there is 
its exposure to alternative methods, theories, and conceptualizations as it extends its scope 
                                                                                                                                                        
Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything (New York: Harper Collins, 2005).  
35 This takes extreme and bizarre form in the rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics, the idea that the 
economy can be derived from brain science, at least in some sense at a deeper level than the optimizing 
individual. See Ben Fine, “Prospecting for Political Economy,” International Journal of Management 
Concepts and Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2011): 204-217. 
36 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 169. 
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across the other social sciences and noneconomic topics, revealing both the narrowness and 
lack of plausibility and suitability of its own principles.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the simplest manner in which to specify the one-dimensionings of mainstream 
economics is by reference to the fetishisms by which the supply and demand of things upon the 
market is the starting point for dividing the market from the nonmarket. Within the market, 
capital is initially fetishistically perceived as a thing with general productive capacities that can 
ultimately deliver utility. But, corresponding principles of production of things becomes 
extended into the production of anything for the equally extended one-dimensional satisfaction 
of utility. In the first instance, this involves the fetishistic invention of other forms of physical 
capital, such as human, natural, and environmental capital.  
Such is the one-dimensioning of the economy by economics. Subsequently, the 
one-dimensioning has been extrapolated to the nonmarket, to society, both to enrich an 
otherwise inexplicable economy itself (“institutions matter” as Nobel Prize-winner 
Douglas North precociously declared) and to facilitate this, other fetishized capitals can 
be invented, such as social capital,37 to fill out the noneconomic. In other words, a 
fetishized notion of capital is imposed on what are not capital relations, as if everything is 
capital-like, just as previously it was seen that everything could become money-like. Such 
social capital, outside of the market, is the alter ego of the new institutional economics, 
for which institutions serve as a generic, umbrella term for everything that is not the 
market, detached from capital, even if interacting with it.38  
In this light, both economy and economics have transformed considerably since the 
drafting of One-Dimensional Man. The Keynesian period seemed to have bred the illusion of the 
end to the crises of capitalism if only by degrading economic and social lives, and the ideologies 
to which they were attached. Since then, though, there have been two major crises. Whilst the 
first, in the wake of the monetarist counterrevolution, brought about a major change in both 
economy and economics, promoting financialization and successive forms of economics 
imperialism, the second has as yet witnessed no major realignments—apart from the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc, the continuing rise of China, and the explicit and sharpening division of the 
European Union into core and periphery in the wake of the current crisis. In parallel to the real 
world, the academic universe of mainstream economics has changed both rapidly and 
extensively but without in some respects having changed at all other than in one-dimensioning 
across more variables and a wider scope of application. Plus ça change, toujours la même chose. 
In this respect, orthodoxy enjoyed and consolidated its hold over the discipline at the 
expense of heterodoxy whilst, in what has been termed the first phase of neoliberalism reaching 
into the early 1990s, the other social sciences tended peremptorily to dismiss this intellectual 
                                                 
37 Of course, social capital is the one-dimensioning of social science and social relations as a whole, with a 
significant presence in economics, but nothing as compared to other disciplines. See Ben Fine, Social 
Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium (London: 
Routledge, 2001); Ben Fine, Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly (London: Pluto Press, 
2010). 
38 The one-dimensioning of institutions begins with the pricing of principle as in North’s new institutional 
economics. See Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis, “From Principle of Pricing to Pricing of Principle: 
Rationality and Irrationality in the Economic History of Douglass North,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 45, no. 3 (July 2003): 546-570. 
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barbarism and instead promoted an entirely different form of individual subjectivity with the 
rise of postmodernism. It critically celebrated self-reflexivity—as opposed to proffering the 
immutably fixed identities and corresponding preferences within and without the domain of the 
market as understood by mainstream economics—and, to parody, a simulacrum of one-
dimensions.  
In short, these two avenues reflect orthogonal one-dimensioning of the social sciences, 
entirely compatible with one another and, essentially, two sides of the same coin although 
embossed with entirely different images and content. Both have evolved during the second 
phase of neoliberalism, as previously delineated above for economics and, in parallel, as 
varieties of post-postmodernisms have taken their turn in tossing the coin. But they have also 
been much more contested than in the first phase of neoliberalism by a radical scholarship that 
has grown in the second phase of neoliberalism in what might broadly be termed the material 
culture of contemporary capitalism. In this, political economy—as opposed to economics—is a 
key component and object of study in its own right. This development has been prompted by 
close attention to the realities of neoliberalism, globalization, and their interactions, with a 
renewed impetus deriving from the global crisis and its unavoidable consequences, however 
much these themselves are subject to competing interpretations and reinterpretations. In 
addition, the process has been accelerated by the global crisis, not least in the demand from 
students in reaction against mainstream economics and that space be given, under the label of 
pluralism, to the acknowledgement let alone the teaching of alternatives. However, whatever 
the strength of such initiatives, and their partnership with those more generally engaged in 
heterodox political economy, which is mushrooming across the social sciences, the prospects for 
alternatives within scholarship depend first and foremost upon the successful pursuit of 
alternatives within the economy itself, and their interaction with scholarship. 
In the interim, there is an essential responsibility on radical scholars to avoid both Oscar 
Wilde’s sentimentalism and cynicism and to expose one-dimensioning, whether it be of housing 
or health, or the new institutional economics or the new economic geography as playthings of 
the latest phase of economics imperialism. For, each of these is differentiated in how they are 
flattened in ways that reflect deep attachments to the systemic tensions of which they are a 
product. It is the virtue of One-Dimensional Man to have exposed one-dimensioning, but it would 
be a vice to succumb to its subtler charms and treat the world of financialized neoliberalism as 
if—as the ad suggests—each real (or imagined) thing were just another Coke.39  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Coca-Cola is perhaps the world’s most ubiquitous and recognized brand commodity. Its famous 
advertising slogan, created in 1969, was “It’s the real thing. Coke.” 
 
 
This is the accepted version of the article published online in Radical Philosophy Review on April 21, 2017: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201741970  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24069/  
 
References 
Al-Jazaeri, Humam. “Interrogating Technical Change through the History of Economic Thought 
in the Context of Latecomers’ Industrial Development: The Case of the South Korean 
Microelectronics, Auto and Steel Industries.” Unpublished PhD thesis. London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2008. 
 
Bayliss, Kate. “Case Study: The Financialisation of Water in England and Wales.” FESSUD 
Working Paper Series, no. 52 (July 2014). http://fessud.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Case-study-the-financialisation-of-Water-in-England-and-
Wales-Bayliss-working-paper-REVISED_annexes-working-paper-52.pdf.  
 
Bayliss, Kate, Ben Fine, and Mary Robertson. “From Financialisation to Consumption: The 
System of Provision Approach Applied to Housing and Water.” FESSUD Working Paper Series, 
no. 2 (2013). http://fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FESSUD-Working-Paper-021.pdf. 
 
Bayliss, Kate, Ben Fine, and Mary Robertson. “Introduction to Special Issue on the Material 
Cultures of Financialisation.” New Political Economy (forthcoming; published online November 
28, 2016). doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2017.1259304. 
 
Bayliss, Kate, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Waeyenberge, eds. The Political Economy of Development: 
The World Bank, Neoliberalism and Development Research. London: Pluto Press, 2011. 
 
Birch, Kean, and Vlad Mykhnenko, eds. The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an 
Economic Order? London: Zed Books, 2010.  
 
Chang, Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, and Linda Weiss, eds. Developmental Politics in Transition: The 
Neoliberal Era and Beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Christophers, Brett. Banking Across Boundaries: Placing Finance in Capitalism. Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013. 
 
Fine, Ben. Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of 
the Millennium. London: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Fine, Ben. The World of Consumption. London: Routledge, rev. ed., 2002. 
 
Fine, Ben. “The Economics of Identity and the Identity of Economics?” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 33, no. 2 (2009): 175-191. doi: 10.1093/cje/ben036. 
 
Fine, Ben. Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly. London: Pluto Press, 2010. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Zombieconomics: The Living Death of the Dismal Science.” In The Rise and Fall of 
Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order?, edited by Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko, 
153-170. London: Zed Books, 2010. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Locating Financialisation.” Historical Materialism 18, no. 2 (2010): 97-116. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Prospecting for Political Economy.” International Journal of Management Concepts 
and Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2011): 204-217. doi.org/10.1504/IJMCP.2011.043754. 
 
This is the accepted version of the article published online in Radical Philosophy Review on April 21, 2017: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201741970  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24069/  
 
Fine, Ben. “Neoliberalism in Retrospect? It’s Financialisation, Stupid.” In Developmental Politics 
in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited by Chang, Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, and Linda 
Weiss, 51-69. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Consumption Matters: The Politics of Consumption.” Ephemera: Theory and Politics 
in Organization 13, no. 2 (2013): 217-248. http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/ 
consumption-matters.  
 
Fine, Ben. “Economics—Unfit for Purpose: The Director’s Cut.” Department of Economics, 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, Working Paper Series, no. 
176. http://www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file81476.pdf. Revised and 
shortened as, “Economics: Unfit for Purpose.” Review of Social Economy 71, no. 3 (2013): 373-
389. doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2013.799969. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Financialization from a Marxist Perspective.” International Journal of Political 
Economy 42, no. 4 (2013): 47–66. 
 
Fine, Ben. “Towards a Material Culture of Financialisation.” FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 
15 (2013). http://fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Towards-a-Material-Culture-of-
Financialisation-FESSUD-Working-Paper-15.pdf. 
 
Fine, Ben. “The Material and Culture of Financialisation.” New Political Economy (forthcoming; 
published online November 28, 2016). doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2017.1259299. 
 
Fine, Ben. Microeconomics: A Critical Companion. London: Pluto, 2016. 
 
Fine, Ben, Kate Bayliss, and Mary Robertson. “From Financialisation to Systems of Provision”, 
FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 191, (2016). http://fessud.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/FESSUD_WP191_From-Financialisation-to-Systems-of-Provision.pdf.  
 
Fine, Ben, and Ourania Dimakou. Macroeconomics: A Critical Companion. London: Pluto, 2016. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Ellen Leopold. “Consumerism and the Industrial Revolution.” Social History 15, no. 
2 (1990): 151-179. www.jstor.org/stable/4285840. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Ellen Leopold. The World of Consumption. London: Routledge, 1993. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Dimitris Milonakis. From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics: The Shifting 
Boundaries Between Economics and Other Social Sciences. London: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Dimitris Milonakis. “From Principle of Pricing to Pricing of Principle: Rationality 
and Irrationality in the Economic History of Douglass North.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 45, no. 3 (July 2003): 546-570. doi.org/10.1017/S0010417503000252. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Dimitris Milonakis. “‘Useless but True’: Economic Crisis and the Peculiarities of 
Economic Science.” Historical Materialism 19, no. 2 (2011): 3–31. [London: The Isaac and 
Tamara Deutscher Memorial Lecture (November, 12, 2010).] 
 
Fine, Ben, Alfred Saad-Filho, Kate Bayliss, and Mary Robertson. “Thirteen Things You Need to 
Know about Neoliberalism.” FESSUD Working Paper Series, no. 155 (2016). 
http://fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/13-Things-you-need-to-know-about-
Neoliberalism-working-paper155.pdf. Revised as Ben Fine and Alfred Saad-Filho. “Thirteen 
This is the accepted version of the article published online in Radical Philosophy Review on April 21, 2017: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201741970  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24069/  
 
Things You Need to Know about Neoliberalism.” Critical Sociology (forthcoming; published 
online August 2016). doi: 10.1177/0896920516655387. 
 
Fine, Ben, and Alfred Saad-Filho. Marx’s Capital. London: Pluto Press, 6th ed., 2016. 
 
Frank, Robert H. The Economic Naturalist: Why Economics Explains Almost Everything. London: 
Virgin Books, 2007. 
 
Lapavitsas, Costas. Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All. London: Verso, 
2013. 
 
Leigh, Andrew. The Economics of Just About Everything. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014. 
 
Levitt, Steven D., and Stephen J. Dubner. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden 
Side of Everything. New York: Harper Collins, 2005. 
 
Magdoff, Harry, and Paul M. Sweezy. Stagnation and the Financial Explosion. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1987. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 
1964; Boston: Beacon Press, 2nd ed., 1991. 
 
Milonakis, Dimitris, and Ben Fine. From Political Economy to Economics: Method, the Social and 
the Historical in the Evolution of Economic Theory. London: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Ritzer, George. The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of 
Contemporary Social Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1993. 
 
Ritzer, George. The Globalization of Nothing. London: Pine Forge Press, 2003. 
 
Robbins, Lionel. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. London: Macmillan, 
1932. 
 
Wilde, Oscar. “Lady Windermere's Fan.” In The Importance of Being Earnest and Other Plays, 
105-182. London: Pocket Books, 2005. 
